This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Wages, Fringe Benefits and Efficiency in Union-Firm Bargaining

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Elie Appelbaum () (York University, Canada)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper provides an efficient union-firm bargaining solution within the right to manage framework, by separating efficiency and distribution considerations through bargaining over wage and fringe benefits. We show that without insurance considerations, efficiency is achieved by equating the wage and workers’ opportunity cost and providing the union with a surplus share in accordance with its bargaining power. We also show that with insurance considerations, the optimal contract, again, equates the wage and workers’ opportunity cost, but it also provides full insurance. There is empirical evidence that fringe benefits are, indeed, common and play an important role in union contracts.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/research/workingPapers/working_papers/2008/labour-bar.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by York University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008_04.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:yca:wpaper:2008_04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3
Phone: (416) 736-5083
Fax: (416) 736-5987
Web page: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Support).

Related research
Keywords: Price Union Contracts Efficient Bargaining Right to Manage

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Oswald, Andrew J., 1993. "Efficient contracts are on the labour demand curve : Theory and facts," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 85-113, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Bean, Charles R, 1984. "Optimal Wage Bargains," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 51(202), pages 141-49, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 1999. "A trade union model with endogenous militancy: interpreting the French case," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 355-373, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "Trade Unions, Wages and Unemployment: What Can Simple Models Tell Us?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 526-45, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bughin, Jacques, 1996. "Trade Unions and Firms' Product Market Power," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 289-307, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Oswald, Andrew J & Turnbull, Peter J, 1985. "Pay and Employment Determination in Britain: What Are Labour," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 80-97, Summer.
  8. Simon P. Anderson & Michael Devereux, 1989. "Profit-Sharing and Optimal Labour Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 425-33, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Booth, Alison L, 1995. "Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 62(248), pages 551-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.