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Competition for status acquisition in public good games

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Author Info
Felix Munoz-Garcia () (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)
Abstract

This paper examines the role of status acquisition as a motive for giving in voluntary contri- butions to public goods. In particular, every donor's status is given by the difference between his contribution and that of the other donor. Specifically, I show that contributors give more than in standard models where status is not considered, and their donation is increasing in the value they assign to status. In addition, players'contributions are increasing in the value that their opponents assign to status, reflecting donors' intense competition to gain social status. Furthermore, I consider contributors'equilibrium strategies both in simultaneous and sequen- tial contribution mechanisms. Then, I compare total contributions in both of these mechanisms. I find that the simultaneous contribution order generates higher total contributions than the sequential mechanism only when donors are sufficiently homogeneous in the value they assign to status. Otherwise, the sequential mechanism generates the highest contributions. Updated 6-03-09.

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File URL: http://www.ses.wsu.edu/PDFFiles/WorkingPapers/Munoz/Competition-Status-acquisition.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University in its series Working Papers with number 2008-12.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-2

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Related research
Keywords: Public goods games; Status acquisition; Competition.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin & Vesterlund, Lise, 2005. "After you--endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1399-1419, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Varian, Hal R., 1994. "Sequential contributions to public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 165-186, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1085-1107, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Lise Vesterlund & Cagri Kumru, 2005. "The Effects of Status on Voluntary Contribution," Working Papers 266, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ball, Sheryl & Eckel, Catherine C., 1998. "The Economic Value of Status," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 495-514. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2001. "Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 423-447, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Congleton, Roger D., 1989. "Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 175-190, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sheryl Ball & Catherine Eckel & Philip J. Grossman & William Zame, 2001. "Status In Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 161-188, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. John Duffy & Tatiana Kornienko, 2005. "Does Competition Affect Giving? An Experimental Study," Experimental 0508002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.

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