Long Term Versus Temporary Certified Emission Reductions in Forest Carbon-Sequestration Programs
AbstractUnder the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, forest projects can receive returns for carbon sequestration via two credit instruments: temporary (tCERs) or long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs). This article develops a theoretical model of optimal harvesting strategies that compares private optimal harvest decision under these two instruments. We find that risk neutral landowners are likely to prefer instituting lCERs over tCERs to maximize surplus. A particular type of early harvest penalty implemented under the lCERs is critical in determining the length of rotation intervals and the carbon credit supply. When this penalty is an increasing function of the difference in biomass before and after harvesting across verification periods, the landowner may choose longer or shorter rotation intervals compared to the Faustmann rotation. The resulting supply curve may have a backward bending region over a range of carbon prices.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University in its series Working Papers with number 2009-20.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
forest rotation; long term certified emission reductions (lCERs); carbon sequestration;
Other versions of this item:
- Gregmar I. Galinato & Aaron Olanie & Shinsuke Uchida & Jonathan K. Yoder, 2011. "Long‐term versus temporary certified emission reductions in forest carbon sequestration programs," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 55(4), pages 537-559, October.
- Galinato, Gregmar I. & Olanie, Aaron & Uchida, Shinsuke & Yoder, Jonathan K., 2010. "Long Term Versus Temporary Certified Emission Reductions in Forest Carbon-Sequestration Programs," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 60744, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-03-13 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-03-13 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2010-03-13 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Olschewski, Roland & Benítez, Pablo C. & de Koning, G.H.J. & Schlichter, Tomás, 2005. "How attractive are forest carbon sinks? Economic insights into supply and demand of Certified Emission Reductions," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 77-94, September.
- Gregmar I. Galinato & Shinsuke Uchida, 2011. "The Effect of Temporary Certified Emission Reductions on Forest Rotations and Carbon Supply," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 59(1), pages 145-164, 03.
- Cacho, Oscar J. & Lipper, Leslie & Moss, Jonathan, 2013. "Transaction costs of carbon offset projects: A comparative study," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 232-243.
- David Walker, 2014. "The Economic Potential for Forest-Based Carbon Sequestration under Different Emissions Targets and Accounting Schemes," Working Papers 2014.02, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
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