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Development and the Interaction of Enforcement Institutions

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  • Dhillon, Amrita

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

  • Rigolini, Jamele

    (The World Bank & University of Warwick)

Abstract

We examine how institutions that enforce contracts between two parties, producers and consumers, interact in a competitive market with one-sided asymmetric information and productivity shocks. We compare an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in “connectedness,” with a formal mechanism, legal enforcement, the effectiveness of which can be reduced by producers by means of bribes. When legal enforcement is poor, consumers connect more with one another to improve informal enforcement; in contrast, a well-connected network of consumers reduces producers’ incentives to bribe. In equilibrium, the model predicts a positive relationship between the the frequency of productivity shocks, bribing, and the use of informal enforcement, providing a physical explanation of why developing countries often fail to have efficient legal systems. Firm-level estimations confirm the partial equilibrium implications of the model

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 748.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:748

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Keywords: Contracts; Institutions; Corruption; Reputation; Uncertainty.;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Tabellini, Guido, 2007. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6534, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Shingo Ishiguro, 2011. "Relationships and Growth," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 11-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  3. Shingo Ishiguro, 2011. "Relationships and Growth," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 11-31-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised May 2013.
  4. Gani, Azmat & Clemes, Michael D., 2013. "Modeling the effect of the domestic business environment on services trade," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 297-304.
  5. Francois, Patrick, 2008. "Norms and Institution Formation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Rubinchik, Anna & Samaniego, Roberto M., . "Demand For Contract Enforcement in A Barter Environment," Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics WP2011/15, University of Haifa, Department of Economics, revised 06 Dec 2011.
  7. Michi NISHIHARA & Takashi SHIBATA, 2013. "Preemption, leverage, and financing constraints," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 13-05, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).

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