This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Saving Europe's Automatic Stabilizers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Barry Eichengreen (University of California, Berkeley)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

European policy makers have repeatedly suggested that fiscal- policy coordination and fiscal federalism will play key roles in Europe's monetary union. This paper warns that this hope is misplaced. Fiscal federalism will not be available to offset recessionary shocks for the foreseeable future. The effects of coordination designed to internalize the cross-border spillovers of fiscal policies are too weak. Freeing up fiscal policy to replace national governments' loss of monetary independence requires allowing European countries' automatic stabilizers to operate. That in turn requires a flexible application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact. The solution suggested here is that the Excessive Deficit Procedure and any fines and sanctions associated with the Stability Pact be applied to the constant- employment budget balance, not the actual deficit. Applying them to actual deficits when European countries enter EMU up against the 3 percent limit will render fiscal policy strongly procyclical, aggravating the problem of macroeconomic fragility created by the loss of monetary autonomy. Still, countries like Germany haunted by the specter of fiscal profligacy need to be reassured that member states will not abuse their fiscal discretion. Procedural and institutional reform to offset the deficit bias in national political systems is the obvious quid pro quo.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/9805/9805013.ps.gz
File Format: application/postscript
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/9805/9805013.html
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/9805/9805013.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/papers/9805/9805013.doc.gz
File Format: application/msword
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number 9805013.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 29 May 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:9805013

Note: 21 pages, text only
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
F0 - International Economics - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Buiter, Willem H & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "`Excessive Deficits': Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht," CEPR Discussion Papers 750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. von Hagen, Jurgen & Hammond, George W, 1998. "Regional Insurance against Asymmetric Shocks: An Empirical Study for the European Community," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 331-53, June.
    Other versions:
  3. Mélitz, Jacques & Vori, Silvia, 1992. "National Insurance Against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 697, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Barry Eichengreen., 1990. "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?," Economics Working Papers 90-151, University of California at Berkeley.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ray Barrell & Ian Hurst & Álvaro Pina, 2002. "Fiscal Targets, Automatic Stabilisers and their Effects on Output," Working Papers 2002/05, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
  2. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Franc, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Artis, Michael J & Buti, Marco, 2000. ""Close to Balance or in Surplus": A Policy Maker's Guide to the Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact," CEPR Discussion Papers 2515, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jörg Bibow, 2001. "Making EMU Work: some lessons from the 1990s," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 233-259, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jörg Bibow, 2001. "On the 'Burden' of German Unification: The Economic Consequences of Messrs. Waigel and Tietmeyer," Macroeconomics 0106004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).

This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.