Should Europe Get Rid of the Stability and Growth Pact?
AbstractThe paper addresses the question of the abolition of the Stability and Growth Pact. More and more authors and policymakers are arising the negative impacts of the European deficit rule on te countries and their ability to respond an asymmetric economic shock. Some others are asking for a redefinition of the Pact. If the focus is only fiscal and in light of the non-respect of the Pact by two of the biggest countries in Europe since its implementation, it could be demonstrated that the SGP needs at least a reexamination. To the converse, if we introduce into the analysis its impacts on the European structural policies, things are different and getting rid of the SGP could hinder the still up-to-date convergence prospective. Indeed, this paper proposed a theoretical analysis of the SGP that emphasizes a new feature of the SGP: a strong incentive to structural reforms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Middlebury College, Department of Economics in its series Middlebury College Working Paper Series with number 0415.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2004
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
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