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Instytucjonalne uwarunkowania wspólnej polityki pieniężnej w Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej / Institutional Framework of Single Monetary Policy in The Economic and Monetary Union

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  • Michał Laskowski

    (University of Lodz)

Abstract

This paper aims to examine changes, which appeared within institutional framework of monetary policy in the Economic and Monetary Union after the crisis of 2008. Theoretical base for research was the new institutionalism under the methodological principles and criteria prepared by Douglass North. The analysis consist of two steps. The first describes institutional matrix of monetary policy in EMU. The second compares formal and informal institutions of monetary policy in the Eurozone before and after 2008. The analysis revealed, that changes have been made in monetary policy principles and tools. Nevertheless, institutional matrix was not changed.

Suggested Citation

  • Michał Laskowski, 2016. "Instytucjonalne uwarunkowania wspólnej polityki pieniężnej w Unii Gospodarczej i Walutowej / Institutional Framework of Single Monetary Policy in The Economic and Monetary Union," International Economics, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, issue 16, pages 313-331, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ann:inecon:y:2016:i:16:p:313-331
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary policy; institutional matrix; central banking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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