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Per-Mile Premiums for Auto Insurance

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Author Info
Aaron S. Edlin (UC Berkeley & NBER)

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Abstract

Americans drive 2,360,000,000,000 miles each year, far outstripping other nations. Every time a driver takes to the road, and with each mile she drives, she exposes herself and others to the risk of accident. Insurance premiums are only weakly linked to mileage, however and have largely lump-sum characteristics. The result is too much driving and too many accidents. This paper begins by developing a model of the relationship between driving and accidents that formalizes Vickrey's [1968] central insights about the accident externalities of driving. We use this model to estimate the driving, accident, and congestion reductions that could be expected from switching to other insurance pricing systems. Under a competitive system of per-mile premiums, in which insurance companies quote risk-classified per-mile rates, we estimate that the reduction in insured accident costs net of lost driving benefits would be $9.8 - $12.7 billion nationally, or $58 - $75 per insured vehicle. When uninsured accident cost savings and congestion reductions are considered, the net benefits rise to $25 - $29 billion, exclusive of monitoring costs. The total benefits of a uniform per- gallon insurance charge could be $1.3 - $2.3 billion less due to heterogeneity in fuel efficiency. The total benefit of "optimal" per- mile premiums in which premiums are taxed to account for accident externalities would be $32 - $43 billion, or $187 -$254 per vehicle, exclusive of monitoring costs. One reason that insurance companies may not have switched to per-mile premiums on their own is that most of the benefits are external and the transaction costs to the company and its customers of checking odometers could exceed the $31 per vehicle of gains that a single company could temporarily realize on its existing base of customers.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/9902/9902002.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 9902002.

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Length: 63 pages
Date of creation: 12 Feb 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:9902002

Note: Type of Document - Acrobat.pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; pages: 63; figures: separate document
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: externalities; accidents; auto insurance; tort law;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

Cited by:
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  1. Parry, Ian, 2003. "Comparing Alternative Policies to Reduce Traffic Accidents," Discussion Papers dp-03-07, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, 2003. "The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws in Traffic Fatalities," NBER Working Papers 9602, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Laszlo Goerke, 2003. "Road Traffic and Efficient Fines," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 65-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Aaron Edlin & Pinar Karaca-Mandic, 2003. "The Accident Externality from Driving," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1058, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Kopits, Elizabeth & Cropper, Maureen, 2005. "Why have traffic fatalities declined in industrialized countries ? Implications for pedestrians and vehicle occupants," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3678, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Parry, Ian, 2005. "Is Pay-As-You-Drive Insurance a Better Way to Reduce Gasoline than Gasoline Taxes?," Discussion Papers dp-05-15, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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