Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs - How spatial evolution leads to inequality
AbstractWe present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of players. We consider a world where pairs of players are matched forever. These players learn from the whole population but they are more likely to learn to strategies used by their partners. Thus, several features of spatial evolution are captured while nonlinearities that would arise with more complex networks are avoided. We can identify characteristics of evolution in networks such as stable cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games and long run exploitation among different strategies. We further discuss evolution of repeated game strategies in this framework comparing synchronous models with asynchronous ones.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9510004.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 30 Oct 1995
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on NeXT; to print on PostScript; pages: 30; figures: included. The most current electronic version is available at http://witch.econ3.uni- bonn.de/~oliver/evolPair.shtml
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Web page: http://126.96.36.199
Evolutionary Game Theory; Networks;
Other versions of this item:
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1995. "Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs How spatial evolution leads to enequality," Discussion Paper Serie B 329, University of Bonn, Germany.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
- R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Game Theory and Information
9403003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 1994.
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- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1995. "Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoners' Dilemma," Discussion Paper Serie B 330, University of Bonn, Germany.
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9612r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Bryan Routledge, . "Co-Evolution and Spatial Interactoin," GSIA Working Papers 1997-46, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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