Co-Evolution and Spatial Interactoin
AbstractThis paper investigates the phenomenon of co- evolution. Co-evolution exists when behaviour evolves and agent fitness depends on the evolving behaviour of other agents. An evolutionary model where agents are located on a torus and play repeated prisoner'
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business in its series GSIA Working Papers with number 1997-46.
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Postal: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
Web page: http://www.tepper.cmu.edu/
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- Tomas Klos, .
"Decentralized Interaction and Co-adaptation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 1997
88, Society for Computational Economics.
- Klos, Tomas B., 1997. "Decentralized interaction and co-adaptation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Research Report 97B33, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
- Robert Hoffmann, 1999. "The Independent Localisations of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 57-72, August.
- Haider, Adnan, 2005. "Using Genetic Algorithms to Develop Strategies for the Prisoners Dilemma," MPRA Paper 28574, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Apr 2006.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1995.
"Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs How spatial evolution leads to enequality,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
329, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Oliver Kirchkamp, 1995. "Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs - How spatial evolution leads to inequality," Game Theory and Information 9510004, EconWPA.
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