Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information
AbstractThis paper analyzes sequential games of double-sided Bertrand competition in the deposit and credit markets, when banks are free to reject customers and cannot distinguish among borrowers. The timing of competition is crucial when customers apply once. Interest rates are pushed upwards when the deposit market is the first to be visited, whereas rates are submitted to downward pressures otherwise. With multiple applications, the order of competition does not matter. Multiple applications in one market weaken competition in that market and generate outcomes similar to the case when this market is visited in a second stage in the single-application framework.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0211002.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 05 Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on pc; pages: 50
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Financial intermediation; Bertrand competition; Dual competition; Adverse selection; Credit rationing;
Other versions of this item:
- Frédérique Bracoud, 2002. "Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/15, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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