State Aid and Competition in Banking: The Case of China in the Late Nineties
AbstractA reduced form model where banks can pursue other goals than profit maximization is presented. This allows us to test for behavioral changes of banks over time. This model provides a framework to evaluate whether moral hazard issues may plague banks receiving state aid, which concerns greatly the recent debate on government intervention in financial markets during the global financial crisis in 2008. To test the impact of state aid, a natural experiment in the banking sector in China in the 1990s is examined. The possibility of receiving state aid triggers moral hazard prone conduct cannot be rejected.
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Date of creation: Feb 2010
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banks; moral hazard; Europe; history; banking; crisis; commercial banks; Panzar â€“Rosse Model; monopoly environment; revenue maximization ; output maximization; revenue elasticity; United Statesgovernment intervention; china; financial markets;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-03-06 (Banking)
- NEP-TRA-2010-03-06 (Transition Economics)
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