Bertrand Competition For Deposits And Loans Under Asymmetric Information: Stiglitz And Weiss Revisited
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Liverpool Management School in its series Research Papers with number 1999_01.
Date of creation: 1999
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Postal: Management School University of Liverpool, Chatham Street, Liverpool, L69 7ZH, Great Britain
Phone: +44(0)151 795 3108
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Web page: http://www.liv.ac.uk/management/
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- Frédérique Bracoud, 2002.
"Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information,"
Game Theory and Information
- Frédérique Bracoud, 2002. "Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/15, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
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