Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default
AbstractThis paper models a sequential double price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers' default. If this revenue is non-monotonic with the asking price, the Walrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 4 (2007)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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- Yanelle, Marie-Odile, 1989. "The strategic analysis of intermediation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 294-301, March.
- Frédérique Bracoud, 2002.
"Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information,"
Game Theory and Information
- Frédérique Bracoud, 2002. "Sequential Models of Bertrand Competition for Deposits and Loans under Asymmetric Information," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/15, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Stahl, Dale O, II, 1988. "Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 189-201, March.
- Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, January.
- Linda Toolsema, 2001. "Reserve requirements and double Bertrand competition among banks," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(5), pages 291-293.
- Ruiz-Porras, Antonio, 2008.
"Los beneficios del liderazgo en el mercado de depósitos bancarios: Una comparación entre Cournot y Stackelberg
[The benefits of leadership in the banking deposit market: A comparison between Cour," MPRA Paper 11351, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Antonio Ruiz-Porras, 2008. "Los beneficios del liderazgo en el mercado de depositos bancarios: una comparacion entre Cournot y Stackelberg," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Negocios, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 4(2), pages 79-105, Enero-Jun.
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