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The Dynamics of Deposit Insurance and the Consumption Trap

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Author Info
Hans Gersbach ()

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Abstract

We investigate a banking system subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks and show that without deposit rate control, the banking system collapses with certainty. Any initial level of reserves will delay the collapse but not avoid it. Even without a banking collapse, the economy still converges to a consumption trap with positive probability. Savings are maximal in the consumption trap, but are used entirely to pay back obligations of banks. No long-term investments can be financed and GDP is minimal. We discuss stronger intervention rules that avoid both a collapse and the consumption trap, confirming that capital requirements are an early indicator signaling when intervention may become necessary. Our analysis provides an explanation why economies which experience a banking crisis may endure long-lasting economic downturns.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 509.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_509

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Related research
Keywords: Financial intermediation; macroeconomic risks; banking crises; deposit insurance; banking regulation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Williamson, Stephen D, 1987. "Financial Intermediation, Business Failures, and Real Business Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1196-1216, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Hellwig, Martin, 1997. "Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-35, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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    Other versions:
  5. Uhlig, H., 1995. "Transition and Financial Collapse," Discussion Paper 66, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," NBER Working Papers 7265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Yanelle, Marie-Odile, 1997. "Banking Competition and Market Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(2), pages 215-39, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gersbach, Hans & Uhlig, Harald, 1997. "Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena," CEPR Discussion Papers 1742, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1997. "Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 523-46, June.
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  10. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1998. "The Economics of Bank Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(4), pages 745-70, November.
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  12. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-91, August.
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  13. Thomas F. Hellmann & Kevin C. Murdock & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Blum, Jurg & Hellwig, Martin, 1995. "The macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy requirements for banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 739-749, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, 1998. "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Thakor Anjan V., 1993. "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 2-50, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Ben S. Bernanke, 1983. "Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 1054, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hans Gersbach & Jan Wenzelburger, 2004. "Do Risk Premia Protect from Banking Crises," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000356, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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