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Iterated Expectations with Common Beliefs

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Author Info
Alfredo Di Tillio (University of Pennsylvania)

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Abstract

This paper generalizes a result by Samet concerning iterated expecta- tions and common priors. When a player in some state of the world is allowed to ascribe probability zero to that state, something not allowed in Samet s framework, iterated expectations may not converge, and when they do, common knowledge of their limit may not characterize a common prior. It is shown here that replacing common knowledge with common belief, convergence is still lost in general, but when it obtains, the full characterization is restored.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0209/0209004.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0209004.

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Length: 5 pages
Date of creation: 24 Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0209004

Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on LaTeX; to print on Postscript; pages: 5; figures: included/request from author/draw your own
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Related research
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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  1. Samet, Dov, 1998. "Iterated Expectations and Common Priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 131-141, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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