Underground Activity And Institutional Change: Productive, Protective And Predatory Behavior In Transition Economies
AbstractThis paper examines why some transitions are more successful than others by focusing attention on the role of productive, protective and predatory behaviors from the perspective of the new institutional economics. Many transition economies are characterized by a fundamental inconsistency between formal and informal institutions. When formal and informal rules clash, noncompliant behaviors proliferate, among them, tax evasion, corruption, bribery, organized criminality, and theft of government property. These wealth redistributing protective and predatory behaviors activities absorb resources that could otherwise be used for wealth production resulting in huge transition costs. Noncompliant behaviors--evasion, avoidance, circumvention, abuse, and/or corruption of institutional rules--comprise what we can be termed underground economies. A variety of underground economies can be differentiated according to the types of rules violated by the noncompliant behaviors. The focus of the new institutional economics is on the consequences of institutions--the rules that structure and constrain economic activity--for economic outcomes. Underground economics is concerned with instances in which the rules are evaded, circumvented, and violated. It seeks to determine the conditions likely to foster rule violations, and to understand the various consequences of noncompliance with institutional rules. Noncompliance with ‘bad” rules may actually foster development whereas non compliance with “good” rules will hinder development. Since rules differ, both the nature and consequences of rule violations will therefore depend on the particular rules violated. Institutional economics and underground economics are therefore highly complementary. The former examines the rules of the game, the latter the strategic responses of individuals and organizations to those rules. Economic performance depends on both the nature of the rules and the extent of compliance with them. Institutions therefore do affect economic performance, but it is not always obvious which institutional rules dominate. Where formal and informal institutions are coherent and consistent, the incentives produced by the formal rules will affect economic outcomes. Under these circumstances, the rule of law typically secures property rights, reduces uncertainty, and lowers transaction costs. In regimes of discretionary authority where formal institutions conflict with informal norms, noncompliance with the formal rules becomes pervasive, and underground economic activity is consequential for economic outcomes.
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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 06 May 2003
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transition economies; underground economies; institutions; property rights; transaction costs; tax evasion; corruption; rent seeking.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- P2 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- O5 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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