Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model
AbstractInstitutional arrangements are key drivers of the use of common-pool resources (CPR). The analysis of existing arrangements requires a framework that allows research to describe a case study systematically and diagnose the institutional setting. Based on a sound understanding of current institutions the question of what effects alternate arrangements would have becomes evident. This step requires a predictive model, which can either be qualitative or, preferably, analyses an empirical case quantitatively. A major conceptual challenge of a quantitative model is the evolution of rules, which define the boundaries for the agents to choose strategies. This paper develops the conceptual foundations for such a modelling approach and an agent-based model for the analysis of institutional arrangements in a CPR setting.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu in its journal Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems.
Volume (Year): 5 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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multi-agent simulation; agent-based modelling; institutional arrangements; common-pool resources;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- Q19 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Other
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