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Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model

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  • Alexander Smajgl

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    (CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems)

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    Abstract

    Institutional arrangements are key drivers of the use of common-pool resources (CPR). The analysis of existing arrangements requires a framework that allows research to describe a case study systematically and diagnose the institutional setting. Based on a sound understanding of current institutions the question of what effects alternate arrangements would have becomes evident. This step requires a predictive model, which can either be qualitative or, preferably, analyses an empirical case quantitatively. A major conceptual challenge of a quantitative model is the evolution of rules, which define the boundaries for the agents to choose strategies. This paper develops the conceptual foundations for such a modelling approach and an agent-based model for the analysis of institutional arrangements in a CPR setting.

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    File URL: http://indecs.eu/2007/indecs2007-pp56-80.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu in its journal Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems.

    Volume (Year): 5 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 56-80

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    Handle: RePEc:zna:indecs:v:5:y:2007:i:2:p:56-80

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    Related research

    Keywords: multi-agent simulation; agent-based modelling; institutional arrangements; common-pool resources;

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