Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate
AbstractAugust 1999 For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in continuum economies, agents cannot influence prices strategically. Or the results concern social choice with a variable number of agents. This paper considers allocations granting agents equal rights to choose net trade vectors within a convex cone and, in order to exclude autarky, an additional right to mediate mutually beneficial transactions. Under standard assumptions, these properties characterize Walrasian equilibria without transfers. JEL: Classifications: D63, D50
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Date of creation: Aug 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
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