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Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate

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Author Info
Peter J. Hammond

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Abstract

August 1999

For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in continuum economies, agents cannot influence prices strategically. Or the results concern social choice with a variable number of agents. This paper considers allocations granting agents equal rights to choose net trade vectors within a convex cone and, in order to exclude autarky, an additional right to mediate mutually beneficial transactions. Under standard assumptions, these properties characterize Walrasian equilibria without transfers.

JEL: Classifications: D63, D50

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Paper provided by Stanford University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 99019.

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Date of creation: Aug 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:99019

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  1. Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 263-82, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1974. "An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(3), pages 425-33, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M. & Segal, Uzi, 1999. "Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies Are Perfectly Competitive," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 169-225, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mirrlees, James A, 1969. "The Dynamic Nonsubstitution Theorem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(105), pages 67-76, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Schmeidler, David & Vind, Karl, 1972. "Fair Net Trades," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(4), pages 637-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-93, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Madden, Paul, 1978. "Why the Edgeworth Process Assumption Isn't That Bad," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(2), pages 279-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Hammond, Peter J., 1986. "Project evaluation by potential tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-36, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Diewert, W. E., 1983. "Cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation : A comparison of alternative approaches," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 265-302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Hammond, Peter J, 1987. "Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(3), pages 399-412, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1981. "Fair allocations in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 269-282, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1982. "A Note on Incentives in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(4), pages 627-35, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Maniquet, Francois, 2001. "On decomposable exchange rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 375-380, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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