Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate

Contents:

Author Info

  • Peter J. Hammond

Abstract

August 1999 For economies with a fixed finite set of traders, few results characterize Walrasian equilibria by their social choice properties. Pareto efficient allocations typically require lump-sum transfers. Other characterizations based on the core or strategyproofness apply only when, as in continuum economies, agents cannot influence prices strategically. Or the results concern social choice with a variable number of agents. This paper considers allocations granting agents equal rights to choose net trade vectors within a convex cone and, in order to exclude autarky, an additional right to mediate mutually beneficial transactions. Under standard assumptions, these properties characterize Walrasian equilibria without transfers. JEL: Classifications: D63, D50

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp99019.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 99019.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Aug 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:99019

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Ralph Landau Economics Building, Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Phone: (650)-725-3266
Fax: (650)-725-5702
Email:
Web page: http://www-econ.stanford.edu/econ/workp/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Schmeidler, David & Vind, Karl, 1972. "Fair Net Trades," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(4), pages 637-42, July.
  2. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
  3. Hammond, Peter J. & Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 113-134, October.
  4. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
  5. Mirrlees, James A, 1969. "The Dynamic Nonsubstitution Theorem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(105), pages 67-76, January.
  6. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
  7. Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M. & Segal, Uzi, 1999. "Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies Are Perfectly Competitive," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 169-225, April.
  8. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  9. Diewert, W. E., 1983. "Cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation : A comparison of alternative approaches," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 265-302, December.
  10. Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1974. "An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(3), pages 425-33, May.
  11. Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-93, November.
  12. Maniquet, Francois, 2001. "On decomposable exchange rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 375-380, March.
  13. Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The competitive allocation process is informationally efficient uniquely," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, October.
  14. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1982. "A Note on Incentives in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(4), pages 627-35, October.
  15. Hammond, Peter J., 1986. "Project evaluation by potential tax reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-36, June.
  16. Hammond, Peter J, 1987. "Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 399-412, July.
  17. Madden, Paul, 1978. "Why the Edgeworth Process Assumption Isn't That Bad," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 279-83, June.
  18. Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 263-82, April.
  19. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1981. "Fair allocations in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 269-282, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jorge Rivera C. & Michael Florig, 2005. "Indivisible goods and fiat money," Working Papers wp212, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  2. Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, 2011. "How the market responds to dynamically inconsistent preferences," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 11-04, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  3. Jorge Rivera C. & Francisco Martínez, 2005. "Consumption rigths: a market mechanism to redistribute wealth," Working Papers wp215, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:99019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.