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Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputation

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  • Jenny Corbett
  • Janet Mitchell

Abstract

This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on the behaviour of troubled banks in light of rescue offers. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises is that in many cases policy authorities make offers of bank rescue, and banks are reluctant to accept these offers. We study situations in which regulators have decided to offer bank rescue plans, and we show that a combination of factors, including bankers' reputational concerns, can explain banks' potential reluctance to accept offers of recapitalisation.

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File URL: http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp290.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 290.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2000-290

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Keywords: banking crises; banking regulation; financial reform;

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Cited by:
  1. Mayes , David G., 2004. "An approach to bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies," Research Discussion Papers, Bank of Finland 4/2004, Bank of Finland.
  2. Philippon, Thomas & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2010. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Misa Tanaka & Glenn Hoggarth, 2006. "Resolving banking crises - an analysis of policy options," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England 293, Bank of England.
  4. Jan Hanousek & Gerard Roland, 2002. "Banking Passivity and Regulatory Failure in Emerging Markets: Theory and Evidence from the Czech republic," Econometrics, EconWPA 0203004, EconWPA.
  5. Dmitri Vinogradov, 2005. "Bailout Policy against Financial Intermediation Failures," Finance, EconWPA 0506003, EconWPA.
  6. Sorana Vătavu & Marilen Pirtea & Sorin Vătavu, 2011. "A Review of Financial Regulations to Avoid the Nationalisation of Losses in the Banking System," Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, University of Petrosani, Romania, University of Petrosani, Romania, vol. 11(1), pages 277-288.
  7. Max Bruche & Gerard Llobet, 2011. "Walking Wounded or Living Dead? Making Banks Foreclose Bad Loans," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group dp675, Financial Markets Group.
  8. Imbierowicz, Björn & Rauch, Christian, 2014. "The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 242-256.
  9. K. Batu Tunay, 2010. "Banking Crises and Early Warning Systems: A Model Suggestion for Turkish Banking Sector," Journal of BRSA Banking and Financial Markets, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, vol. 4(1), pages 9-46.
  10. Alexeev, Michael & Kim, Sunghwan, 2008. "The Korean financial crisis and the soft budget constraint," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 178-193, October.
  11. Jimmy Melo, 2014. "Expectativas cambiarias, selección adversa y liquidez," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(1), pages 27-62, May.
  12. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.

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