We present a model of bank passivity and regulatory failure. Banks with low equity positions have more incentives to be passive in liquidating bad loans. We show that they tend to hide distress from regulatory authorities and are ready to offer a higher rate of interest in order to attract deposits compared to banks that are not in distress. Therefore, higher deposit rates may act as an early warning signal of bank failure. We provide empirical evidence that the balance sheet information collected by the Czech National Bank is not a better predictor of bank failure than higher deposit rates. This confirms the importance of asymmetric information between banks and the regulator and suggests the usefulness of looking at deposit rate differentials as early signals of distress in emerging market economies where banks' equity positions are often low.
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Length: pages Date of creation: 01 Jul 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2001-424
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Other Model Applications E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Meyer, Paul A & Pifer, Howard W, 1970.
"Prediction of Bank Failures,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 853-68, September.
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