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Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputation

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Author Info

  • Corbett, Jenny
  • Mitchell, Janet

Abstract

This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on the behaviour of troubled banks in light of rescue offers. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises is that in many cases policy authorities make offers of bank rescue, and banks are reluctant to accept these offers. We study situations in which regulators have decided to offer bank rescue plans, and we show that a combination of factors, including bankers' reputational concerns can explain banks' potential reluctance to accept offers of recapitalisation.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 32 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 474-512

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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:32:y:2000:i:3:p:474-512

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

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Cited by:
  1. David G. Mayes, 2004. "An approach to bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies," Finance 0404015, EconWPA.
  2. Jimmy Melo, 2014. "Expectativas cambiarias, selección adversa y liquidez," Ensayos Revista de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon, Facultad de Economia, vol. 0(1), pages 27-62, May.
  3. Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, 2011. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers 11-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. Alexeev, Michael & Kim, Sunghwan, 2008. "The Korean financial crisis and the soft budget constraint," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 178-193, October.
  5. Dmitri Vinogradov, 2005. "Bailout Policy against Financial Intermediation Failures," Finance 0506003, EconWPA.
  6. Imbierowicz, Björn & Rauch, Christian, 2014. "The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 242-256.
  7. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.
  8. Jan Hanousek & Gerard Roland, 2001. "Banking Passivity and Regulatory Failure in Emerging Markets: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp192, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  9. Sorana Vătavu & Marilen Pirtea & Sorin Vătavu, 2011. "A Review of Financial Regulations to Avoid the Nationalisation of Losses in the Banking System," Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, University of Petrosani, Romania, vol. 11(1), pages 277-288.
  10. Max Bruche & Gerard Llobet, 2011. "Walking Wounded or Living Dead? Making Banks Foreclose Bad Loans," FMG Discussion Papers dp675, Financial Markets Group.
  11. Misa Tanaka & Glenn Hoggarth, 2006. "Resolving banking crises - an analysis of policy options," Bank of England working papers 293, Bank of England.
  12. K. Batu Tunay, 2010. "Banking Crises and Early Warning Systems: A Model Suggestion for Turkish Banking Sector," Journal of BRSA Banking and Financial Markets, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, vol. 4(1), pages 9-46.

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