Banking crises and government intervention
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2014.08.007
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- Sana Zidi & Boutheina Regaieg & Nessrine Hamzaoui, 2021. "The Determinants of the European Banking Crisis," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 11(4), pages 115-122.
- Polyzos, Stathis & Samitas, Aristeidis & Kampouris, Ilias, 2021. "Economic stimulus through bank regulation: Government responses to the COVID-19 crisis," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
- Ghosh, Amit, 2016. "How does banking sector globalization affect banking crisis?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 70-82.
- Matías Cabrera & Gerald P. Dwyer & María J. Nieto, 2018. "The G-20 regulatory agenda and bank risk," Working Papers 1829, Banco de España.
- Samitas, Aristeidis & Polyzos, Stathis & Siriopoulos, Costas, 2018. "Brexit and financial stability: An agent-based simulation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 181-192.
- Qianqian Gao & Hong Fan & Shanshan Jiang, 2018. "Macroprudential Regulation for the Chinese Banking Network System with Complete and Random Structures," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-22, December.
- Li, Hui & Liu, Hong & Siganos, Antonios & Zhou, Mingming, 2016. "Bank regulation, financial crisis, and the announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings of US commercial banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 37-46.
- Polyzos, Stathis & Samitas, Aristeidis & Katsaiti, Marina-Selini, 2020. "Who is unhappy for Brexit? A machine-learning, agent-based study on financial instability," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
- Samitas, Aristeidis & Polyzos, Stathis, 2016. "Freeing Greece from capital controls: Were the restrictions enforced in time?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 196-213.
- Giuseppe Mastromatteo & Giuseppe Mastromatteo, 2016. "Minsky at Basel: A Global Cap to Build an Effective Postcrisis Banking Supervision Framework," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_875, Levy Economics Institute.
- Cabrera, Matias & Dwyer, Gerald P. & Nieto, Maria J., 2018. "The G-20′s regulatory agenda and banks’ risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 66-78.
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More about this item
Keywords
Banking crises; Capital requirements; Government intervention; Moral hazard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
Statistics
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