This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Free trade and deep integration : antidumping and antitrust in regional agreements

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Hoekman, Bernard

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Preferential trading agreements (PTAs) are increasingly including elements of"deep"integration--efforts to agree on common regulatory regimes. The author explores what the PTA experience suggests about the relationship between shallow integration--attaining unconditional intra-area free trade (including the abolition of antidumping)--and deeper integration, especially agreement about common antitrust rules. He argues that common antitrust disciplines in PTAs tend to be driven by a broader agenda--which revolves around attaining economic integration (for example, by creating a single market), not by a need to abolish antidumping. Many PTAs continue to apply antidumping to internal trade flows. In practice, it may be that the demise of antidumping in PTAs is constrained because governments are concerned about the potential for their partners to engage in beggar-thy-neighbor industrial policies. They may consider antidumping a useful defensive instrument in this connection, as it can substitute for instruments such as countervailing duties, which have a much higher foreign policy content andmay be more difficult to pursue. If so, antidumping is a particularly ineffective and costly instrument. Eliminating it in PTAs would help focus attention on the real source of trade problems (industrial policies and government interventions) rather than on the symptoms (allegations of unfair dumping).

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1998/07/01/000009265_3980928162543/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1950.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 31 Jul 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1950

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

Related research
Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Rules of Origin; Labor Policies; Environmental Economics&Policies; Trade Policy; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Trade and Regional Integration; Rules of Origin;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Vandenbussche, Hylke & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1996. "European Anti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National and International Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 1469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Mata, José & Pita Barros, Pedro Luis, 1996. "Competition Policy in Portugal," CEPR Discussion Papers 1441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Staiger, Robert W. & Wolak, Frank A., 1992. "The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 265-287, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Pittman, R., 1997. "Competition Law in Central Eastern Europe: Five Years Later," Papers 97-2, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
  6. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1989. "Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion," NBER Working Papers 3016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Bernard Hoekman, 1997. "Competition Policy and the Global Trading System," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(4), pages 383-406, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rowat, M. & Lubrano, M. & Porrata, R.Jr., 1997. "Competition Policy and MERCOSUR," Papers 385, World Bank - Technical Papers.
  9. Collie, David, 1991. "Export subsidies and countervailing tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3-4), pages 309-324, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James A, 2000. "Merger Policies And Trade Liberalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Hoekman, Bernard M. & Leidy, Michael P., 1992. "Cascading contingent protection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 883-892, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. David R. Collie, 2003. "Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 55-71, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Reitzes, James D, 1993. "Antidumping Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 745-63, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ronald Fischer & Martín Osorio, 2002. "Why Do We Need Antidumping Rules?," Documentos de Trabajo 134, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc and its associated services are free for contributors and users, and do not accept any advertising.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.