Free trade and deep integration : antidumping and antitrust in regional agreements
AbstractPreferential trading agreements (PTAs) are increasingly including elements of"deep"integration--efforts to agree on common regulatory regimes. The author explores what the PTA experience suggests about the relationship between shallow integration--attaining unconditional intra-area free trade (including the abolition of antidumping)--and deeper integration, especially agreement about common antitrust rules. He argues that common antitrust disciplines in PTAs tend to be driven by a broader agenda--which revolves around attaining economic integration (for example, by creating a single market), not by a need to abolish antidumping. Many PTAs continue to apply antidumping to internal trade flows. In practice, it may be that the demise of antidumping in PTAs is constrained because governments are concerned about the potential for their partners to engage in beggar-thy-neighbor industrial policies. They may consider antidumping a useful defensive instrument in this connection, as it can substitute for instruments such as countervailing duties, which have a much higher foreign policy content andmay be more difficult to pursue. If so, antidumping is a particularly ineffective and costly instrument. Eliminating it in PTAs would help focus attention on the real source of trade problems (industrial policies and government interventions) rather than on the symptoms (allegations of unfair dumping).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1950.
Date of creation: 31 Jul 1998
Date of revision:
Economic Theory&Research; Rules of Origin; Labor Policies; Environmental Economics&Policies; Trade Policy; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Trade and Regional Integration; Rules of Origin;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- TF0 - - - - - -
- FUN - International Economics - - - - -
- OPE - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - - - -
- ADM - General Economics and Teaching - - - - -
- FEE - International Economics - - - - -
- INC - Health, Education, and Welfare - - - - -
- AND - General Economics and Teaching - - - - -
- EXP - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - - - -
- ACC - General Economics and Teaching - - - - -
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Collie, D., 1990.
"Export Subsidies And Countervailing Tariffs,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
353, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Massimo Motta & Fabrizio Onida, 1997. "Trade Policy and Competition Policy," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 56(1-2), pages 67-97, June.
- Veugelers, Reinhilde & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 1999.
"European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/101535, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Veugelers, Reinhilde & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 1999. "European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-28, January.
- Veugelers, Reinhilde & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 1996. "European anti-dumping policy and the prefitability of national and international colusion," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/219462, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Vandenbussche, Hylke & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1996. "European Anti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National and International Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 1469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Staiger, Robert W. & Wolak, Frank A., 1992.
"The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 265-287, May.
- Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1990. "The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly," NBER Working Papers 3254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Staiger, R.W. & Wolak, F.A., 1990. "The Effec Of Domestic Antidumping Law In The Presence Of Foreign Monopoly," Working Papers e-90-8, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- Pittman, R., 1997. "Competition Law in Central Eastern Europe: Five Years Later," Papers 97-2, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1989.
"Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion,"
NBER Working Papers
3016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Staiger, R.W. & Wolak, F.A., 1989. "Strategic Use Of Untidumping Law To Enforce Tacit International Collusion," Working Papers e-89-20, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- Bernard Hoekman, 1997. "Competition Policy and the Global Trading System," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 383-406, 07.
- Henrik Horn & James Levinsohn, 1997.
"Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization,"
NBER Working Papers
6077, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James A, 2000. "Merger Policies And Trade Liberalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Horn, H. & Levinsohn, J., 1998. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization," Working Papers 420, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- Mata, José & Pita Barros, Pedro Luis, 1996. "Competition Policy in Portugal," CEPR Discussion Papers 1441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rowat, M. & Lubrano, M. & Porrata, R.Jr., 1997. "Competition Policy and MERCOSUR," Papers 385, World Bank - Technical Papers.
- Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
- David R. Collie, 2003. "Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 55-71, February.
- Hoekman, Bernard M. & Leidy, Michael P., 1992. "Cascading contingent protection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 883-892, May.
- Togan, Sübidey, 1997. "Opening up the Turkish Economy in the Context of the Customs Union with EU," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 12, pages 157-179.
- Reitzes, James D, 1993. "Antidumping Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 745-63, November.
- Michael P. Leidy, 1997. "Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the United States," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 44(1), pages 132-144, March.
- Siroën, Jean-Marc, 2002. "Politique(s) de la concurrence dans une économie globale," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6628, Paris Dauphine University.
- Ronald Fischer & Martín Osorio, 2002. "Why Do We Need Antidumping Rules?," Documentos de Trabajo 134, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.