This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Trade Policy and Competition Policy

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Massimo Motta () (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)
Fabrizio Onida (Bocconi University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Despite the reduction in trade barriers which has followed successive GATT agreements, national governments still affect trade flows by using instruments such as quantitative restrictions to imports, antidumping actions, state subsidies, preferential procurement policies, and definitions of standards. The use of these instruments for protectionist purposes is also in conflict with competition policy objectives in the home markets, since a decrease in the competitive pressure of imports enhances market power of the domestic firms. Governments should avoid the temptation to resort to such instruments for protectionist purposes. In particular, a reform of anti-dumping laws, to which governments have increasingly resorted over the recent years, is necessary. Besides unilateral reforms, more international cooperation should be fostered to control that the use of the aforementioned instruments does not degenerate in protectionist spirals which would result in welfare losses for all the countries involved. We also point out that different domestic competition laws might in turn have an affect on trade. However, the danger that governments might use competition policy as a “strategic trade” device to help the national industry should probably not be emphasised, since in many cases lax rules would be as detrimental to national as to foreign welfare. Harmonisation of competition policies is probably not necessary, but in any case would be a very difficult objective to reach. This is because there often exists little consensus on the policies which should be followed, since countries genuinely differ in their evaluations about such policies. However, the definition of a clear set of rules which establishes the assignment of competition policy cases to a particular jurisdiction, by avoiding costly duplications and increasing the certainty of the rules, should receive priority in the international agenda.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University in its journal Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia.

Volume (Year): 56 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (June)
Pages: 67-97
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v56_n1-2_p67-97

Contact details of provider:
Postal: via Sarfatti, 25 - 20136 Milano (Italy)
Phone: 0039-02-58363301
Fax: 0039-02-58363302
Web page: http://www.gde.unibocconi.it/

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.gde.unibocconi.it

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Melissa Fiorucci).

Related research
Keywords: antitrust; European union; trade policy;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2000. "Endogenous Vertical Restraints in International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James A, 2000. "Merger Policies And Trade Liberalization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Cabral, Luís M B, 2003. "An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3878, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You may want to explore EconPapers, which displays the same data as IDEAS in a different way.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.