Controlling tropical deforestation : an analysis of alternative policies
AbstractAfter discussing ownership issues related to tropical forests, theauthor develops a simple general equilibrium model to represent - at least in a stylized way - the salient aspects of the deforestation process. He uses the model to generate first- and second-best policy options for controlling deforestation and, later, to assess the environmental consequences of government policies often cited in the literature on deforestation. Property rights, though important for understanding the process of tropical deforestation, do not necessarily point to a simple or straightfoward fix for environmental problems, particularly in developing countries. The sheer size, communal nature of service flows, and pervasiveness of individual access to tropical forests make monitoring and enforcement costly in some situations and unimaginable in others. Redefining nominal rights in ways that appear to correct inefficiencies may yield gains in some cases, but an approach to environmental protection that leans heavily on this prescription seems aimed more at symptoms than at causes, says the author. Moreover, policy approaches based on the use of Pigovian taxes or marketable permit schemes may yield efficiency gains in some cases, but such approaches generally involve the same monitoring and enforcement problems that prevent the market from solving allocation problems. Simple, direct solutions to deforestation and other environmental problems are unavailable, but an ability to understand the environmental and welfare consequences of policies adopted for other reasons is useful - if only to help policymakers avoid mistakes that would otherwise go unrecognized. The model the author develops for this purpose is highly stylized and intended primarily to provide a systematic way of thinking about the environmental and welfare effects of government policy - for example, by considering patterns of substitution among inputs and outputs, in cases where an environmental resource to which people have free access is exploited. If the use of first-best policies is infeasible - whether because of monitoringcosts, transboundary effects, or other reasons - then it becomes important to have detailed knowledge of patterns of substitution and complementarity among ordinary inputs and environmental resources, and information on the use of various environmental resources in the production of specific goods and services. Knowledge of such factors can permit policymakers to pursue policy goals in situations where first-best instruments are unavailable.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1029.
Date of creation: 30 Nov 1992
Date of revision:
Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Public Sector Economics&Finance; Forestry; Markets and Market Access;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pitt, Mark M., 1985. "Equity, externalities and energy subsidies The case of kerosine in Indonesia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 201-217, April.
- Jeffrey R. Vincent, 1990. "Rent Capture and the Feasibility of Tropical Forest Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 66(2), pages 212-223.
- Lopez, Ramon & Niklitschek, Mario, 1991. "Dual economic growth in poor tropical areas," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 189-211, October.
- William F. Hyde & Roger A. Sedjo, 1992. "Managing Tropical Forests: Reflections on the Rent Distribution Discussion," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 343-350.
- repec:fth:calaec:4-92 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gregory S. Amacher & Erkki Koskela & Markku Ollikainen, 2004. "Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes," CESifo Working Paper Series 1131, CESifo Group Munich.
- Scrieciu, S. Serban, 2007. "Can economic causes of tropical deforestation be identified at a global level?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3-4), pages 603-612, May.
- Lopez, Ramon, 1997. "Environmental externalities in traditional agriculture and the impact of trade liberalization: the case of Ghana," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 17-39, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.