Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1131.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
illegal logging; royalty design; penalty schemes;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-05-02 (All new papers)
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