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Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes

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  • Gregory S. Amacher
  • Erkki Koskela
  • Markku Ollikainen

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Gregory S. Amacher & Erkki Koskela & Markku Ollikainen, 2004. "Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes," CESifo Working Paper Series 1131, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1131
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1131.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amacher, Gregory S. & Brazee, Richard J., 1997. "Designing Forest Taxes with Varying Government Preferences and Budget Targets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 323-340, March.
    2. Clarke, Harry R. & Reed, William J. & Shrestha, Ram M., 1993. "Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 271-293, September.
    3. repec:cdl:ucsbec:4-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Deacon, Robert T., 1992. "Controlling tropical deforestation : an analysis of alternative policies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1029, The World Bank.
    5. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    6. Gregory S. Amacher, 1999. "Government Preferences and Public Forest Harvesting: A Second-Best Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(1), pages 14-28.
    7. Diamond, Peter A & Yaari, Menahem, 1972. "Implications of the Theory of Rationing for Consumer Choice Under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 333-343, June.
    8. Jeffrey R. Vincent, 1990. "Rent Capture and the Feasibility of Tropical Forest Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 66(2), pages 212-223.
    9. Jeffrey Prestemon, 2000. "Public Open Access and Private Timber Harvests: Theory and Application to the Effects of Trade Liberalization in Mexico," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(4), pages 311-334, December.
    10. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695.
    11. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May.
    12. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
    13. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
    14. Jon G. Sutinen & Peder Andersen, 1985. "The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(4), pages 387-397.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hofstad, Ole, 6. "A theoretical analysis of illegal wood harvesting as predation – with two Ugandan illustrations," Scandinavian Forest Economics: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, Scandinavian Society of Forest Economics, issue 42, April.

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