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Wanted dead and alive: Are hunting and protection of endangered species compatible?

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  • Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson

Abstract

The paper shows that civil war in Burundi in the 1990s has provoked an unprecedented decline in government revenue. Both foreign aid transfers and revenue from domestic sources dried up, inducing the government to rely more on inflation tax. Using quarterly data covering the period from 1980:1 to 2002:4 to measure the sensitivity of money demand to inflation we find that the long-run semi-elasticity of inflation to real money in circulation trebled between the pre-war to the war period. The remarkable increase of the semi-elasticity translates what is known in the literature as economic agents. .flight from domestic currency., a strategy that limits the governments capacity to use inflation tax to compensate for the loss in more traditional revenue sources. Shedding light on the behaviour of the demand for real money amidst persistent political and economic instability, illustrates the limits of using inflation and money creation as a dependable source of government revenue.

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Paper provided by Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford in its series CSAE Working Paper Series with number 2004-20.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2004-20

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  1. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "The Private Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 0062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Rodriguez-Ibeas, Roberto, 2002. "Regulatory Enforcement with Discretionary Fining and Litigation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 105-18, April.
  4. Stigler, George J, 1970. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 526-36, May-June.
  5. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
  6. Lear, Kelly Kristen & Maxwell, John W, 1998. "The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 127-48, September.
  7. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "A note on private enforcement and type-I error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 423-429, September.
  8. Niv (Burnovski), Moshe Bar & Safra, Zvi, 2002. "On the social desirability of wealth-dependent fine policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 53-59, July.
  9. Clarke, Harry R. & Reed, William J. & Shrestha, Ram M., 1993. "Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 271-293, September.
  10. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-87, April.
  11. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1979. "Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines," NBER Working Papers 0338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Jon G. Sutinen & Peder Andersen, 1985. "The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(4), pages 387-397.
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