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The Critical Importance of Information: Incentive Regulation and its Application in Electricity

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  • Evans, Lewis

Abstract

This paper outlines the key distinguishing features of light- and heavy-handed regulation. It Provides an analysis of the importance of informational issues for the conduct of commerce Provides an analysis of informational issues for the design and operation of incentive regulation Uses incentive regulation to assess heavy and light-handed regimes and Analyses certain of the regulatory issues of the electricity market.

Suggested Citation

  • Evans, Lewis, 1998. "The Critical Importance of Information: Incentive Regulation and its Application in Electricity," Working Paper Series 19034, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    • Handle: RePEc:vuw:vuwcsr:19034
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    Keywords

    incentives; electricity;

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