Unnatural Monopolies in Local Telephone
AbstractWe attempt to overcome the serious data problems of past telecommunications cost studies by focusing on local exchange carriers (LECs). With enough degrees of freedom to yield precise estimates, our global subadditivity tests show that the cost function is definitely not subadditive. The results suggest that the benefits to breaking up the monopoly outputs of existing LECs substantially outweigh the potential losses in efficiency. They also support permitting entry and increasing competition in local exchange markets. Furthermore, given the competitive nature of long distance service, it is doubtful that the predivestiture Bell System was a natural monopoly.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.