Central Command, Local Hazard and the Race to the Top
AbstractThis paper explores for the first time the consequences of centrally imposed local tax limitations on the modelling and estimation of spatial auto-correlation in local fiscal policies, and compares three spatial interaction estimators: a) the conventional maximum likelihood estimator that ignores censoring; b) a spatial Tobit estimator; c) a discrete hazard estimator. Implementation of the above empirical approaches on the case of local vehicle taxation in Italy provides a reasonably coherent picture in terms of the direction and size of the spatial interaction process, and offers a plausible spatial interpretation of the race to the top in provincial Vehicle taxes.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Turin in its series Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers with number 200909.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Edoardo Di Porto & Federico Revelli, 2009. "Central command, local hazard and the race to the top," Working Papers 2009/26, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-04 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1999.
"Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form,"
99009, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Revelli, Federico, 2008.
"Performance competition in local media markets,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1585-1594, July.
- Revelli Federico, 2008. "Performance Competition in Local Media Markets," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 200801, University of Turin.
- Downes, Thomas A. & Dye, Richard F. & McGuire, Therese J., 1998. "Do Limits Matter? Evidence on the Effects of Tax Limitations on Student Performance," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 401-417, May.
- Douglas Sutherland & Robert Price & Isabelle Joumard, 2005. "Sub-central government fiscal rules," OECD Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2005(2), pages 141-181.
- Figlio, David N., 1997. "Did the "tax revolt" reduce school performance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 245-269, September.
- Pinkse, Joris & Slade, Margaret E., 1998. "Contracting in space: An application of spatial statistics to discrete-choice models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 125-154, July.
- Case, Anne, 1992. "Neighborhood influence and technological change," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 491-508, September.
- George R. Zodrow, 2008.
"The Property Tax Incidence Debate and the Mix of State and Local Finance of Local Public Expenditures,"
0801, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- George R. Zodrow, 2007. "The Property Tax Incidence Debate and the Mix of State and Local Finance of Local Public Expenditures," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 53(4), pages 495-521, December.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992.
"Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition,"
NBER Working Papers
4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-61, May.
- Hautsch, Nikolaus & Klotz, Stefan, 2003.
"Estimating the neighborhood influence on decision makers: theory and an application on the analysis of innovation decisions,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 97-113, September.
- Nikolaus Hautsch & Stefan Klotz, 2001. "Estimating the Neighborhood Influence on Decision Makers: Theory and an Application on the Analysis of Innovation Decisions," CoFE Discussion Paper 01-04, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
- Dye, Richard F. & McGuire, Therese J. & McMillen, Daniel P., 2005. "Are Property Tax Limitations More Binding over Time?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 58(2), pages 215-25, June Cita.
- Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, D.L.Daniel L., 2004. "Comparative politics and environmental taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 705-722, July.
- Isabelle Joumard & Per Mathis Kongsrud, 2003.
"Fiscal Relations across Government Levels,"
OECD Economic Studies,
OECD Publishing, vol. 2003(1), pages 155-229.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas, 2000.
"Federal Mandates by Popular Demand,"
IDEI Working Papers
120, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2001.
- Thomas J. Nechyba, 1996.
"Local Property and State Income Taxes: The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition and Collusion,"
NBER Working Papers
5419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nechyba, Thomas J, 1997. "Local Property and State Income Taxes: The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition and Collusion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 351-84, April.
- Jon Fiva & Jørn Rattsø, 2007. "Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 457-470, September.
- Bard Harstad, 2006. "Flexible Integration," Discussion Papers 1428, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:att:wimass:9127 is not listed on IDEAS
- Manski, Charles F, 1993.
"Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 531-42, July.
- Maarten Allers & J. Elhorst, 2005. "Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 493-513, August.
- Sole Olle, Albert, 2003. "Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 685-713, November.
- Anwar Shah, 2006. "Fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic management," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 437-462, August.
- Antonio P�ez & Darren M Scott & Erik Volz, 2008. "A discrete-choice approach to modeling social influence on individual decision making," Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 35(6), pages 1055-1069, November.
- Federico Revelli, 2005. "On Spatial Public Finance Empirics," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 475-492, August.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Piero Cavaleri) or (Marina Grazioli).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.