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Sub-central government fiscal rules

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  • Douglas Sutherland
  • Robert Price
  • Isabelle Joumard

Abstract

Rules constraining the discretionary powers of budget policymakers have become widespread among OECD economies, and the expanding role played by decentralised institutions in providing public services has led to their increasing adoption at the sub-central level.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_studies-v2005-art13-en
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by OECD Publishing in its journal OECD Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 2005 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 141-181

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Handle: RePEc:oec:ecokaa:5l9ppn8m62zp

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Cited by:
  1. Revelli, Federico, 2010. "Tax mix corners and other kinks," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201017, University of Turin.
  2. Federico Revelli, 2013. "Tax limits and local democracy," Working Papers 2013/29, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  3. Anna Iara & Guntram B. Wolff, 2011. "Rules and risk in the euro area," Working Papers 615, Bruegel.
  4. Persson, Lovisa, 2013. "Consumption smoothing in a balanced budget regime," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2013:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  5. Persson, Lovisa, 2013. "Consumption smoothing in a balanced budget regim," Working Paper Series 2013:19, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  6. Kaja Fredriksen, 2013. "Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 2. Fiscal Rules for Sub-central Governments, Update of the Institutional Indicator," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1071, OECD Publishing.
  7. Sven Jari Stehn & Annalisa Fedelino, 2009. "Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System," IMF Working Papers 09/124, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Sacchi, Agnese & Salotti, Simone, 2014. "The impact of national fiscal rules on the stabilisation function of fiscal policy," MPRA Paper 56982, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Edoardo Di Porto & Federico Revelli, 2009. "Central command, local hazard and the race to the top," Working Papers 2009/26, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  10. Diego Martínez López & Salvador Barrios, 2013. "Fiscal equalisation schemes and sub-central government borrowing," Working Papers. Serie EC 2013-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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