Sub-central government fiscal rules
AbstractRules constraining the discretionary powers of budget policymakers have become widespread among OECD economies, and the expanding role played by decentralised institutions in providing public services has led to their increasing adoption at the sub-central level.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by OECD Publishing in its journal OECD Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 2005 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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