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Appropriability and Incentives with Complementary Innovations

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  • Massimo D'Antoni

    ()

  • Maria Alessandra Rossi

    ()

Abstract

This article analyzes the effects on ex ante incentives to invest in the development of complementary innovations of two alternative appropriability strategies: a strategy of exclusion of third parties from access (through active enforcement of IPRs or technical means) vis-a-vis an openness strategy, i.e. an ex-ante commitment not to exclude. Assuming that the complementary innovations constitute a common input and that agents make complementary investments in its private exploitation, we find that, when complementarities are sufficiently strong, a commitment to openness may provide greater incentives than an exclusion strategy. The theoretical framework is used to provide an interpretation of Open Source Software licenses and the “Open Science” system.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 603.

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Date of creation: Nov 2010
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Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:603

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Keywords: incentives to innovation; complementarity; intellectual property rights; open source software; open science.;

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