In this paper, I describe and analyze the phenomenon of informal development collaboration between firms in the field of embedded Linux, a type of open source software. To explain the observed phenomenon of voluntary revealing, I develop a duopoly model of quality competition. The central assumptions are that firms require two complementary technologies as inputs, and differ with respect to the relative importance they attach to these technologies. The main results are, first, that a regime with compulsory revealing can lead not only to higher profits, but also to higher product qualities than a proprietary regime. Second, when the decision to reveal is endogenized equilibria arise with voluntary revealing by both players.
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Paper provided by DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies in its series DRUID Working Papers with number
06-25.
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