The Jukebox Mode of Innovation - a Model of Commercial Open Source Development
AbstractIn this paper, I describe and analyze the phenomenon of informal development collaboration between firms in the field of embedded Linux, a type of open source software. To explain the observed phenomenon of voluntary revealing, I develop a duopoly model of quality competition. The central assumptions are that firms require two complementary technologies as inputs, and differ with respect to the relative importance they attach to these technologies. The main results are, first, that a regime with compulsory revealing can lead not only to higher profits, but also to higher product qualities than a proprietary regime. Second, when the decision to reveal is endogenized equilibria arise with voluntary revealing by both players.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies in its series DRUID Working Papers with number 06-25.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
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Innovation; development collaboration; open source software; embedded Linyx;
Other versions of this item:
- Henkel, Joachim, 2004. "The Jukebox Mode of Innovation - A Model of Commercial Open Source Development," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4507, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-12-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2006-12-16 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-INO-2006-12-16 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2006-12-16 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2006-12-16 (Microeconomics)
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