Patent Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking
AbstractWe study several interconnected problems that arise under the current U.S. patent system when a patent covers one component or feature of a complex product. This situation is common in the information technology sector of the economy. Our analysis applies to cases involving reasonable royalties, but not lost profits. First, we show using bargaining theory that the threat to obtain a permanent injunction greatly enhances the patent holderâ€™s negotiating power, leading to royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark range based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of the patent. Such royalty overcharges are especially great for weak patents covering a minor feature of a product with a sizeable price/cost margin, including products sold by firms that themselves have made substantial R&D investments. These royalty overcharges do not disappear even if the allegedly infringing firm is fully aware of the patent when it initially designs its product. However, the hold-up problems caused by the threat of injunctions are reduced if courts regularly grant stays to permanent injunctions to give defendants time to redesign their products to avoid infringement when this is possible. Second, we show how hold-up problems are magnified in the presence of royalty stacking, i.e., when multiple patents read on a single product. Third, using third-generation cellular telephones and Wi-Fi as leading examples, we illustrate that royalty stacking can become a very serious problem, especially in the standard-setting context where hundreds or even thousands of patents can read on a single product standard. Fourth, we discuss the use of â€œreasonable royaltiesâ€ to award damages in patent infringement cases. We report empirical results regarding the measurement of â€œreasonable royaltiesâ€ by the courts and identify various practical problems that tend to lead courts to over-estimate â€œreasonable royaltiesâ€ in the presence of royalty stacking. Finally, we make suggestions for patent reform based on our theoretical and empirical findings.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series with number qt8638s257.
Date of creation: 10 Jan 2007
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patents; intellectual property; standard setting; opportunism; hold-up; injunctions; royalty stacking; reasonable royalties;
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