A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires
AbstractIn this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of a neo-parliamentary or mixed semi-presidential government form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 437.
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O25 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
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- Demange, Gabrielle, 1987. "Nonmanipulable Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-74, September.
- Otten, G.J.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Storcken, T. & Tijs, S.H., 1995.
"Effectivity functions and associated claim game correspondences,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-86380, Tilburg University.
- Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995. "Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May.
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