IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cda/wpaper/193.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness For Correspondences

Author

Listed:
  • Klaus Nehring
  • Massimiliano Marcellino

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Nehring & Massimiliano Marcellino, 2003. "Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness For Correspondences," Working Papers 193, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:193
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/UiqQaRaQnymuukUmMaJLSeex/98-2.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    2. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13220 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-681, April.
    5. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    6. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    7. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
    8. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    9. Kelly, Jerry S, 1977. "Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 439-446, March.
    10. Demange, Gabrielle, 1987. "Nonmanipulable Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1057-1074, September.
    11. Hervé Moulin, 1981. "The Proportional Veto Principle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(3), pages 407-416.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
    2. Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-68, January.
    3. Corchón, Luis C., 2008. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we081207, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2016. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets," MPRA Paper 75927, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Dec 2016.
    5. Sinan Ertemel & Levent Kutlu & M. Remzi Sanver, 2015. "Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 187-201, June.
    6. Felix Brandt, 2015. "Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 793-804, December.
    7. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Implementation in generalized matching problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-439.
    8. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
    9. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
    10. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    11. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus, 2018. "On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-18.
    12. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," MPRA Paper 75469, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2016.
    13. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1984. "Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 397-410, January.
    14. Brandt, Felix & Saile, Christian & Stricker, Christian, 2022. "Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    15. Egor Ianovski & Mark C. Wilson, 2019. "Manipulability of consular election rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(2), pages 363-393, February.
    16. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
    17. Umut Keskin & M. Remzi Sanver & H. Berkay Tosunlu, 2021. "Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 125-141, January.
    18. Manimay Sen, 1984. "Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 251-285, January.
    19. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    20. Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, 2022. "Ambiguous Social Choice Functions," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 660, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:193. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Letters and Science IT Services Unit (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/educdus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.