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Strategy-proofness of a class of Borda rules

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  • Manimay Sen
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    Abstract

    We formalize a class of ‘positional’ systems, and examine the problem of strategic misrevelation of preferences under these systems. The positional systems we consider include a wide class of ranking or point systems, which are variants of the Borda Procedure. We show that all of these systems afford scope for manipulation of social decisions through misrevelation. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00118936
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 43 (1984)
    Issue (Month): 3 (January)
    Pages: 251-285

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:43:y:1984:i:3:p:251-285

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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    1. Kalai, Ehud & Muller, Eitan, 1977. "Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 457-469, December.
    2. Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-61, January.
    3. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-81, April.
    4. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    5. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-51, November.
    6. Moulin, Herve, 1980. "Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 249-269, December.
    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    8. Fine, B & Fine, K, 1974. "Social Choice and Individual Ranking I," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 303-22, July.
    9. Fine, B & Fine, K, 1974. "Social Choice and Individual Rankings II," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 459-75, October.
    10. Dutta, Bhaskar & Pattanaik, Prasanta K, 1978. "On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 163-70, January.
    11. Fishburn, Peter C, 1973. "Summation Social Choice Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1183-96, November.
    12. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(1), pages 53-89, January.
    13. Dutta, Bhaskar, 1980. "On the Possibility of Consistent Voting Procedures," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 603-16, April.
    14. Kelly, Jerry S, 1977. "Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 439-46, March.
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