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On Game Formats and Chu Spaces

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Author Info
Stefano Vannucci ()
Abstract

It is argued that virtually all coalitional, strategic and extensive game formats as currently employed in the extant game-theoretic literature may be presented in a natural way as discrete nonfull or even-under a suitable choice of morphisms- as full subcategories of Chu (Poset 2).

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 417.

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Date of creation: Jan 2004
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Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:417

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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  1. Otten Gert-Jan & Borm Peter & Storcken Ton & Tijs Stef, 1995. "Effectivity Functions and Associated Claim Game Correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 172-190, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
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  3. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Abdou, Joseph & Keiding, Hans, 2003. "On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 243-260, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Selten, Reinhard & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 138-152, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Andjiga, N G & Moulen, J, 1989. "Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for l-Stability of Games in Constitutional Form," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 91-110.
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

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