The Structure of Unstable Power Systems
AbstractA power system is modeled by an interaction form, the solution of which is called a settlement. By stability we mean the existence of some settlement for any preference profile. Like in other models of power structure, instability is equivalent to the existence of a cycle. Structural properties of the system like maximality, regularity, superadditivity and exactness are defined and used to determine the type of instability that may affect the system. A stability index is introduced. Loosely speaking this index measures the difficulty of the emergence of configurations that produce a deadlock. As applications we have a characterization of solvable game forms, an analysis of the structure of their instability and a localization of their stability index in case where solvability fails.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00392515.
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00392515
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Interaction form; effectivity function; stability index; Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium; solvability; acyclicity; Nakamura number; collusion;
Other versions of this item:
- Joseph Abdou, 2009. "The Structure of Unstable Power Systems," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00389181, HAL.
- Joseph Abdou, 2009. "The Structure of Unstable Power Systems," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09042, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.