The Structure of Unstable Power Systems
AbstractA power system is modeled by an interaction form, the solution of which is called a settlement. By stability we mean the existence of some settlement for any preference profile. Like in other models of power structure, instability is equivalent to the existence of a cycle. Structural properties of the system like maximality, regularity, superadditivity and exactness are defined and used to determine the type of instability that may affect the system. A stability index is introduced. Loosely speaking this index measures the difficulty of the emergence of configurations that produce a deadlock. As applications we have a characterization of solvable game forms, an analysis of the structure of their instability and a localization of their stability index in case where solvability fails.
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Date of creation: May 2009
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Interaction form; effectivity function; stability index; Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium; solvability; acyclicity; Nakamura number; collusion;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2009-08-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2009-08-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2009-08-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Eyal Winter & Bezalel Peleg, 2002. "original papers : Constitutional implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 187-204.
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