Drift and Equilibrium Selection with Human and Computer Players
AbstractThe theory of drift (Binmore and Samuelson 1999) concerns equilibrium selection in which second order disturbances may have first-order effects in the emergence of one equilibrium over the other. We provided experimental evidence with human players supporting the model in Caminati, Innocenti and Ricciuti (2006). In this paper we test it with conditioning by computer players. When computers are removed and humans are matched against each other, the comparative static properties of the model are confirmed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Siena in its series Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena with number 012.
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
drift; equilibrium selection; evolutionary games; experiments.;
Other versions of this item:
- Roberto Ricciuti & Alessandro Innocenti & Mauro Caminati, 2008. "Drift and equilibrium selection with human and computer players," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(19), pages 1-7.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-05-12 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2007-05-12 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-05-12 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-05-12 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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