Law and Behaviours in Social Dilemmas: Testing the Effect of Obligations on Cooperation
AbstractLaws consist of two components: the ‘obligations’ they express and the ‘incentives’ designed to enforce them. In this paper we run a public good experiment to test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in social dilemmas. The results show that, for given marginal incentives, different levels of minimum contribution required by obligation determine significantly different levels of average contributions. Moreover, unexpected changes in the minimum contribution set up by obligation have asymmetric dynamic effects on the levels of cooperation: a reduction does not alter the descending trend of cooperation, whereas an increase induces a temporary re-start in the average level of cooperation. Nonetheless, obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation over time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Siena in its series Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena with number 001.
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Obligation; Incentives; Public Good Game; Experiments.;
Other versions of this item:
- Galbiati, R. & Vertova, P., 2005. "Law and Behaviours in Social Dilemmas: Testing the Effect of Obligations on Cooperation," Discussion Paper 2005-56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2005-07-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2005-07-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2005-07-03 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-07-03 (Regulation)
- NEP-SOC-2005-07-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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