In German literature, particularly in poetry, an amazing wealth of illustrations for economic contract theory can be found. Signaling, screening, incentive contracts, the winner's curse, and even the prisoner's dilemma within a team are treated by different writers. The respective examples are attractive for at least two reasons: First, for their clear representation of economic or game theoretic structures; and second, for their interdisciplinary nature, combining economics with law and psychology. Should we thus look at writers as consultants superior to economists? The answer is "no" in the sense that writers do not tell us how to behave in any particular situation, but "yes" in the sense that they remind us to be modest with respect to our strategic faculties; an advice not necessarily welcome to the economists' profession.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: A23 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Graduate D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description) Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
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