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Simple games with many effective voters

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  • Beigman, Eyal
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    Abstract

    The strategic behavior of legislators depends on the information available before and during the legislation process. It is well established in the literature that interested parties such as voters and agenda setters can influence the outcomes of the process through strategic manipulation when they are sufficiently informed. When only partial information on the individual and collective preference is revealed the question of manipulability boils down to how much information must be revealed before a learner is able to use it strategically? This paper applies a model of single agent learning to address this question. Our results show that learning collective preferences in this setting is possible but hard, giving explicit bounds on the amount of information required. The proofs use a Ramsey type theorem for simple games showing that games with many effective voters embed games from at least one of three well-characterized families.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 68 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 15-22

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:1:p:15-22

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

    Related research

    Keywords: Social choice Committee voting Simple games Indeterminacy Ramsey theory;

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    1. Rubinstein,Ariel, 2000. "Economics and Language," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521789905, April.
    2. Salant, Yuval, 2007. "On the learnability of majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 196-213, July.
    3. Gil Kalai, 2004. "Social Indeterminacy," Discussion Paper Series dp362, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    5. Kalai, Gil, 2003. "Learnability and rationality of choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 104-117, November.
    6. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    7. Gil Kalai, 2004. "Social Indeterminacy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1565-1581, 09.
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