AbstractThis paper analyzes the problem of matching heterogeneous agents in a Bayesian learning model. One agent gives a noisy signal to another agent, who is responsible for learning. If production has a strong informational component, a phase of cross-matching occurs, so that agents of low knowledge catch up with those of higher one. It is shown that: (i) a greater informational component in production makes cross-matching more likely; (ii) as the new technology is mastered, production becomes relatively more physical and less informational; (iii) a greater dispersion of the ability to learn and transfer information makes self-matching more likely; and (iv) self-matching leads to more self-matching, whereas cross-matching can make less productive agents overtake more productive ones.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 619.
Date of creation: May 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Diffusion of information; Bayesian learning; matching; assortative mating;
Other versions of this item:
- Rendón, Silvio, . "Informational matching," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/268, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Silvio Rendón, 2002. "Informational Matching," Economics Working Papers we022105, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kremer, M & Maskin, E, 1996.
"Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill,"
96-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Boyan Jovanovic & Yaw Nyarko, 1994.
"The Transfer of Human Capital,"
NBER Working Papers
4823, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson, 2000.
"Sorting and Long-Run Inequality,"
NBER Working Papers
7508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Prescott, Edward C, 1972. "The Multi-Period Control Problem Under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1043-58, November.
- Kremer, Michael, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-75, August.
- Kremer, M., 1996.
"How Much Does Sorting Increase Inequality?,"
96-18, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1777, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.