In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to production can be measured accurately and another in which workers engage in joint production. When individuals have private information about their own talents, the most able workers self-select into the occupation in which their reward best reflects their own performance. I describe an equilibrium in which the country with a more heterogeneous labor force exports the good that is produced by the most talented individuals. In this country, trade exacerbates the "polarization" of labor and often worsens the distribution of income.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 745.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Gene M. Grossman & Giovanni Maggi, 1998.
"Diversity and Trade,"
NBER Working Papers
6741, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Gene M. Grossman & Giovanni Maggi, 2000.
"Diversity and Trade,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1255-1275, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)