IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ulb/ulbeco/2013-226822.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Efficient sorting in frictional labor markets with two-sided heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Luca Paolo Merlino

Abstract

This paper studies how search externalities and wage bargaining distort vacancy creation and the allocation of workers to jobs in markets with two-sided heterogeneity. To do so, I propose a model of a frictional labor market where heterogeneous workers decide which job to look for and firms decide which technology to adopt. At equilibrium, there is perfect segmentation across sectors, which is determined by a unique threshold of workers' productivity. This threshold is inefficient because of participation and composition externalities. The Pigouvian tax scheme that decentralizes optimal sorting shows that these externalities have opposite signs. Furthermore, their relative strength depends on the distribution of workers' skills, so that when there are many (few) skilled workers, too many (few) high-technology jobs are created.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Paolo Merlino, 2016. "Efficient sorting in frictional labor markets with two-sided heterogeneity," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/226822, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/226822
    Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/226822/3/EfficientSortingInFrictionalLaborMarkets.pdf
    File Function: Full text for the whole work, or for a work part
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cahuc, Pierre & Wasmer, Etienne, 2001. "Does Intrafirm Bargaining Matter In The Large Firm'S Matching Model?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(5), pages 742-747, November.
    2. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    3. Charlot, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck & Ulus, Mustafa, 2013. "Efficiency in a search and matching economy with a competitive informal sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 192-194.
    4. Burren, Daniel & Neusser, Klaus, 2013. "The Role Of Sectoral Shifts In The Decline Of Real Gdp Volatility," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(3), pages 477-500, April.
    5. Nicolas L. Jacquet & Serene Tan, 2007. "On the Segmentation of Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(4), pages 639-664, August.
    6. James Albrecht & Susan Vroman, 2002. "A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill Requirements," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 283-305, February.
    7. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
    8. Juan J. Dolado & Marcel Jansen & Juan F. Jimeno, 2009. "On‐the‐Job Search in a Matching Model with Heterogeneous Jobs and Workers," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 200-228, January.
    9. Daron Acemoglu, 1999. "Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1259-1278, December.
    10. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. "Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 266-291, April.
    11. Bruno Decreuse, 2008. "Choosy Search And The Mismatch Of Talents," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(3), pages 1067-1089, August.
    12. Kevin Lang & Michael Manove & William T. Dickens, 2005. "Racial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1327-1340, September.
    13. Kevin Lang & William T. Dickens, 1992. "Labor Market Segmentation, Wage Dispersion and Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 4073, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2010. "Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 539-574, March.
    15. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-894, October.
    16. Uren Lawrence, 2006. "The Allocation of Labor and Endogenous Search Decisions," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-31, June.
    17. Blázquez, Maite & Jansen, Marcel, 2008. "Search, mismatch and unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 498-526, April.
    18. Albrecht, James & Navarro, Lucas & Vroman, Susan, 2010. "Efficiency in a search and matching model with endogenous participation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 48-50, January.
    19. Shouyong Shi, 2002. "A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill-Biased Technology," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(2), pages 467-491.
    20. Merlino, Luca Paolo, 2012. "Discrimination, technology and unemployment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 557-567.
    21. Coen N. Teulings & Pieter A. Gautier, 2004. "The Right Man for the Job," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 553-580.
    22. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
    23. Pieter A. Gautier & Coen N. Teulings & Aico Van Vuuren, 2010. "On-the-Job Search, Mismatch and Efficiency ," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(1), pages 245-272.
    24. Khalifa, Sherif, 2012. "Job Competition, Crowding Out, And Unemployment Fluctuations," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-34, February.
    25. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luca Paolo Merlino & Pierpaolo Parrotta & Dario Pozzoli, 2018. "Gender Differences in Sorting," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 671-709, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Blázquez, Maite & Jansen, Marcel, 2008. "Search, mismatch and unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 498-526, April.
    2. Guillaume Wilemme, 2021. "Optimal Taxation to Correct Job Mismatching," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 40, pages 170-197, April.
    3. Gavrel, Frédéric, 2012. "On the inefficiency of matching models of unemployment with heterogeneous workers and jobs when firms rank their applicants," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1746-1758.
    4. Huanxing Yang, 2020. "Targeted search, endogenous market segmentation, and wage inequality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(2), pages 367-414, March.
    5. Richard Rogerson & Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, 2004. "Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market-A Survey," NBER Working Papers 10655, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Rogerson, Richard & Shimer, Robert, 2011. "Search in Macroeconomic Models of the Labor Market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 7, pages Pages: 61, Elsevier.
    7. Gavrel, Frédéric, 2009. "Technical skill bias as a response of firms to unemployment: A matching model with applicant ranking and endogenous skill requirements," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 304-310, June.
    8. Eleftheriou, Konstantinos, 2011. "Efficiency and specialization: A search theoretic approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 229-238, January.
    9. Lam, Wing Tung, 2020. "Inefficient sorting under output sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    10. Arnaud Chéron & Jean-Olivier Hairault & François Langot, 2013. "Life-Cycle Equilibrium Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(4), pages 843-882.
    11. Sattinger, Michael, 2006. "Overlapping labour markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 237-257, April.
    12. Guillaume Rocheteau & Pierre‐Olivier Weill, 2011. "Liquidity in Frictional Asset Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(s2), pages 261-282, October.
    13. Yashiv, Eran, 2007. "Labor search and matching in macroeconomics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1859-1895, November.
    14. Gavrel, Frédéric & Lebon, Isabelle, 2009. "Endogenous job specialization," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 328-334, March.
    15. David M. Arseneau & Brendan Epstein, 2018. "Efficient Mismatch," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-037, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. Jackson, Paul, 2023. "Equilibrium underemployment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    17. Batyra, Anna & Sneessens, Henri R., 2010. "Selective reductions in labor taxation: Labor market adjustments and macroeconomic performance," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 531-543, July.
    18. Arnaud Chéron & Jean‐Olivier Hairault & François Langot, 2011. "Age‐Dependent Employment Protection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1477-1504, December.
    19. Blázquez, Maite & Jansen, Marcel, 2003. "Efficiency in a matching model with heterogeneous agents: too many good or bad jobs?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we035019, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    20. Duffie, Darrell & Qiao, Lei & Sun, Yeneng, 2018. "Dynamic directed random matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 124-183.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/226822. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsulbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.