Nicolas L. Jacquet () (School of Economics, Singapore Management University) Serene Tan () (Department of Economics, National University of Singapore)
Abstract
This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is non-transferable. We depart from standard matching models where all agents are assumed to be in a unique meeting place by assuming the existence of in?nitely many meeting places and allowing each agent to choose which meeting place to be in. The market is thus allowed to be segmented into di¤erent meeting places, and agents not only get to choose who to match with, but also who they meet with. We show that in equilibrium all market structures feature perfect segmentation where agents match with the ?rst person they meet. All these market structures have the same matching pattern, implying that the value of search to each agent is the same. Although perfect assortative matching cannot be obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is nevertheless greater than in standard models.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Singapore Management University, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
18-2007.
Length: 25 pages Date of creation: Apr 2007 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series Handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:18-2007
Find related papers by JEL classification: J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Akihiko Matsui & Takashi Shimizu, 2005.
"A Theory Of Money And Marketplaces,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 35-59, 02.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"A Theory of Marriage: Part II,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Marriage, Family, Human Capital, and Fertility, pages 11-26
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]