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Market Discipline in Emerging Economies: Beyond Bank Fundamentals

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Author Info

  • Eduardo Levy Yeyati
  • Maria Soledad Martinez Peria
  • Sergio Schmukler

Abstract

This paper studies how institutional factors and systemic risks (driven by macroeconomic conditions) prevalent in emerging economies may impact market discipline among banks (traditionally understood as market responses to bank fundamentals). First, we discuss how certain institutional features of emerging economies (underdeveloped capital markets, pervasive government ownership of banks, greater guarantees, inadequate disclosure and transparency) may affect market responses to bank risk. Second, using the recent Argentine crisis as an illustration, we argue that systemic risks may exert an overwhelming impact on market behavior, overshadowing the link between the latter and bank fundamentals. Thus, market discipline, while missing in the traditional sense, may be indeed quite robust once systemic risks are factored in. We conclude that in emerging economies the analysis of market discipline should take into account the importance of institutional and systemic factors.

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File URL: http://www.utdt.edu/departamentos/empresarial/cif/pdfs-wp/wpcif-012004.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in its series Business School Working Papers with number marketdiscipline.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:marketdiscipline

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References

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  1. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Tito Cordella, 1997. "Public Disclosure and Bank Failures," IMF Working Papers 97/96, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
  3. Sironi, Andrea, 2003. " Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 443-72, June.
  4. Sergio L. Schmukler & Eduardo Levy-Yeyati & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2004. "Market Discipline under Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 318, Econometric Society.
  5. Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 1999. "Do depositors punish banks for"bad"behavior? : market discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2058, The World Bank.
  6. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt as bank capital: a proposal for regulatory reform," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q II, pages 40-53.
  7. Allen N. Berger, 1991. "Market discipline in banking," Proceedings 328, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  8. Abhiman Das & Saibal Ghosh, 2004. "Market Discipline In The Indian Banking Sector: An Empirical Exploration," Finance 0410020, EconWPA.
  9. Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr, Gerard & Levine, Ross, 2001. "The regulation and supervision of banks around the world - a new database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2588, The World Bank.
  10. Schumacher, Liliana, 2000. "Bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net: Argentina and the 'tequila' shock," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 257-277, August.
  11. Roberto Steiner & Adolfo Barajas, 2000. "Depositor Behavior and Market Discipline in Colombia," IMF Working Papers 00/214, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Augusto de la Torre & Sergio Schmukler, 2003. "Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina´s Currency Board," Business School Working Papers catorce, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  13. María Soledad Martínez-Peria & Sergio Schmukler, 2002. "Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (S (ed.), Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 5, pages 143-174 Central Bank of Chile.
  14. Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2003. "The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1539-1560, August.
  15. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Alexei Karas & William Pyle & Koen Schoors, 2006. "Sophisticated Discipline in Nascent Deposit Markets: Evidence from Post-Communist Russia," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0607, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  2. Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Alain Ize & Miguel A. Kiguel, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economies," IMF Working Papers 05/188, International Monetary Fund.
  3. A. Karas & W. Pyle & K. Schoors, 2007. "Sophisticated Discipline in a Nascent Deposit Market: Evidence from Post-Communist Russia," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 07/450, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  4. Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2004. "Market discipline under systemic risk - evidence from bank runs in emerging economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3440, The World Bank.
  5. Menkhoff, Lukas & Chodechai Suwanaporn, Chodechai, 2005. "On the Rationale of Bank Lending in Pre-Crisis Thailand," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover dp-326, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  6. Vasso Ioannidou & Jan de Dreu, 2006. "The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline," DNB Working Papers 089, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  7. Helder Mendonça & Renato Villela Loures, 2009. "Market discipline in the Brazilian banking industry: an analysis for the subordinated debt holders," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 286-307, December.
  8. Alain Ize & Miguel Kiguel & Eduardo Levy Yeyati, 2005. "Managing Systemic Liquidity Risk in Financially Dollarized Economy," Business School Working Papers managsystrisk, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.

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